Abstract. The subject of this talk will be so-called Secretary Problems, (also known as Marriage, Dowry, or Best-choice Problems), and more generally, Optimal-Stopping Problems. The basic framework is that a sequence of random variables (stock prices, offers on a house, "test scores" for job applicants [eg for a secretarial position]) is being observed, and the objective is to decide when to stop in order to maximize the reward. The classical "no-information" secretary problem and its solution will be reviewed, along with game-theoretic extensions, analogs for "full-information and "partial-information" stopping, a few counterintuitive surprises, and several basic unsolved problems.

    THIS PAGE IS NOT A PUBLICATION OF THE GEORGIA
    INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE GEORGIA INSTITUTE
    OF TECHNOLOGY HAS NOT EDITED OR EXAMINED
    THE CONTENT. THE AUTHORS OF THE PAGE ARE SOLELY
    RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTENT.  THE OPINIONS ON THIS
    PAGE ARE NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE GEORGIA
    INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, ALTHOUGH THEY SHOULD BE.